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Abstract 
This work evaluates the role of institutions and other control variables on per capita income and growth 
models for a set of almost one hundred countries, using cross-section and dynamic panel data analysis to 
answer two questions. Institutions have a primary role on explaining huge cross-country differences on per 
capita income levels when compared to other control variables such as trade integration and geography? 
Does long-run growth performance relies mainly on institutional quality? The 2SLS and OGMM results for 
per capita income levels models suggest that there are some evidence regarding the role of institutions since 
all the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant but the instruments are not valid. Trade 
integration and geography do not seem to play a direct and significant role on explaining differences in per 
capita income levels. On the other hand, the results from the growth models suggest that there is scarce 
evidence for the role of institutions in fostering economic growth and the System-GMM is the one that is 
more likely to capture such role. In one word, there is no indication of an empirical consensus to claim that 
institutions have a primary role on growth and income models, but after all, the institutional environment 
seems to matter.   
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Resumo  
O trabalho avalia o papel das instituições e outras variáveis de controle em modelos de renda per capita e de 
crescimento para um conjunto de quase cem países através de análises de painel e corte transversal para 
responder duas questões. Instituições têm um papel primordial na explicação das grandes diferenças nos 
níveis de renda per capita entre países quando comparado com variáveis tais como integração comercial e 
geografia? O desempenho em termos de crescimento de longo prazo depende de maneira crucial da 
qualidade institucional? Os resultados das estimações por 2SLS e OGMM para os modelos de renda per 
capita sugerem que há alguma evidência quanto ao papel das instituições dado que todos os coeficientes 
estimados são positivos e estatisticamente significativos, mas os instrumentos não são válidos. Integração 
comercial e geografia não têm um papel direto e significativo na explicação das diferenças de níveis de 
renda per capita. Por outro lado, os resultados dos modelos de crescimento sugerem evidências menos 
robustas para o papel das instituições em estimular o crescimento econômico sendo que as estimações por 
System GMM foram aquelas em que este papel é mais facilmente encontrado. Sumarizando, pode se 
argumentar que não há indicação de um consenso empírico a favor do argumento de que instituições têm um 
papel primordial nos modelos de crescimento e de renda per capita, porém, o ambiente institucional parece 
ser relevante.   
 
Palavras-Chave: Modelos de Crescimento e Nível de Renda per Capita; Instituições: Análise de Painel e 
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Introduction 
A wide variety of empirical studies on growth and per capita income levels using institutions as an 
explanatory variable have been developed during the last ten years and the empirical consensus is that the 
institutions matter but one can say that there is no consensus on what is called the institution rule 
hypothesis. In other words, once we incorporate institutions in our model, it is not clear if other factors 
such as geography will play only an indirect role on growth and differences in income levels.    
The study has two main empirical goals. First, estimate growth models and evaluate the relevance 
of institutions and other macroeconomic variables by the estimation of a dynamic panel data model using 
the GMM (System and Difference) method. Second, estimate cross-section per capita income models 
using 2SLS and Optimal GMM (OGMM) to address whether or not institutions have a primary role when 
compared to other control variables (geographical and integration indicators). The variable used as proxy 
for institutional quality is the Law and Order (Law) index for both (growth and per capita income) 
models.   
The paper is divided in four sections other than this introduction and final remarks. Section one is 
devoted to summarize the empirical and theoretical literature on economic growth and differences in per 
capita income levels among countries with the inclusion of institutions and other control variables. 
Section two develops a cross-section analysis based on a per capita income level and summarizes the 
results. Section three focuses on estimating a growth model using panel data analysis and the GMM 
estimation method. Section four compares the empirical results from the literature and the ones from the 
previous two sections.  
1 – Institutions, Differences in Per Capita Income and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence  
Economic growth and differences in countries per capita income levels have been the focus of 
several research studies in the field of macroeconomics and also a topic of interest for policymarkers, as 
well as in other areas of research, such as reduction of poverty and economic development. The literature 
of economic growth and differences on per capita income levels has been highlighted in recent past 
decades both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Most of this advance is due to new econometric 
techniches and longer database, incorporating lessons from the endogenous growth and human capital 
models, and empirically the advance is associated on how to deal with the endogeneity problem and how 
to use valid instruments. The use of econometric techniques based on GMM estimation for dynamic panel 
data analysis for growth models and cross-section analysis with two stage least squares (2SLS) and 
optimal GMM to test for differences in per capita income levels is part of this advance and both of them 
will be implemented in this paper.
1 
The empirical evidence from the growth and the cross country income levels difference literatures 
suggests a positive association with the quality of institutions meaning that better institutions foster long 
run economic growth and countries with better institutions are the ones with higher per capita income 
levels. Figure 1 below illustrates such evidence for our complete set of 91 countries where the proxy for 
institution (Law & Order) shows a positive and statistically ignificant coefficient when plotted against the 
                                                           
1 A historical look on the growth literature reveals that during the 1950s and 1960s growth theory was linked primarily to the 
neoclassical model developed by Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956), Swan (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). These 
models were based on the so-called convergence property and the idea is that economies with low per capita GDP will face 
higher growth rates given the assumption of diminishing capital returns. Since the 1980s, the concept of capital in the 
neoclassical model has been expanded to incorporate not only physical capital but also human capital, as seen through the 
models developed by Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991), among others. Romer (1995) highlights the dilemma encountered by the 
theoretical and empirical growth literatures and the contribution of endogenous growth theory for understanding the long-term 
growth, arguing that the main contribution of this approach is to provide a theory of technological progress, one of the central 
elements absent from the neoclassical growth model, and the inclusion of a theory of technological change in the neoclassical 
framework is difficult, since the conventional assumptions of competitiveness can not be maintained. Knight, Loayza and 
Villanueva (1993) test the neoclassical model of growth for 98 countries, from 1960 to 1985 in order to establish the relative 
importance to economic growth of factors that are specific to the countries and which vary over time, as is the case of human 
capital investment and the degree of openness. The empirical results found indicate that such factors have an important and 
positive role for growth. 3 
 
log of per capita GDP and the GDP growth rate. Regardless of such primary evidence it is necessary to 
investigate econometrically such relationship in both models using the adequate techniques such as GMM 
System and Difference for growth models and 2SLS and OGMM for models of per capita income levels. 
It is fair to say that the positive coefficients reported in both graphs does not imply a specific causality 
from institutions to GDP growth and per capita GDP levels since we might face reverse causality in the 
sense that countries with higher income levels and growth rates can create a better institutional 
environment, which is likely to happen in most cases.  
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Initially, it is necessary to address the role of institution and its definition. Douglas North 
(1990) definition of institutions is associated to the idea that institutions are the rules of the game in a 
society and it imposes constraints that shape human interaction. Acemoglu et. al (2004) highlights the 
relevance of institutions for improving economic growth and development, arguing that: 
“Economic institutions are important because they influence the structure of economic incentives in society, 
and without property rights, individuals will not have the incentive to invest in physical or human capital or 
adopt more efficient technologies. Economic institutions are also important because they help to allocate 
resources to their most efficient uses, they determine who gets profits, revenues and residual rights of 
control.” (2004: p.1-2).  
On the empirical evolution of the growth literature and the contribution of geography, 
integration and institutions, Rodrik et. al (2004) states clearly that: 
“Growth theory has traditionally focused on physical and human capital accumulation, and, in its endogenous 
growth variant, on technological change. But accumulation and technological change are at best proximate 
causes of economic growth. (....) But why did some societies manage to accumulate and innovate more 
rapidly than others? The three-fold classification offered above – geography, integration, and institutions – 
allow us to organize our thoughts on the “deeper” determinants of economic growth. These three are the 
factors that determine which societies will innovate and accumulate, and therefore develop, and which will 
not.” (2004: p.132-33) 
The following review of the literature will be devided into two sets. The first one deal with the 
empirical works where the per capita GDP growth rate is the dependent variable, while the second one 
has the per capita GDP level as the dependent variable since it is concerned with differences in such 
levels across countries and not with their growth rates as it is for the first set of studies.  
The evolution of the empirical growth literature using panel data goes back to the work 
developed by Barro (1995) for a study using data for more than one hundred countries from 1960 to 
1990. The empirical results suggest that, for a given level of real per capita income, the growth rate is 
positively affected by the level of education and life expectancy, low fertility, lower government 4 
 
consumption, by maintaining the rule of law, lower inflation rate, improvement in the terms of trade, 
and negatively by the initial level of real per capita GDP. The inflation rate not only has a negative 
impact on real GDP growth in the long run, but also on the investment rate, but this result is 
statistically significant when the economies with a history of high inflation are included in the 
sample.
2  
Acemoglu et. al (2004) develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in 
economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. According 
to the authors:  
“One of the crucial hypotheses is that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of 
different patterns of economic growth is based on the notion that it is the way that humans themselves 
decide to organize their societies that determines whether or not they prosper. Some ways of organizing 
societies encourage people to innovate, to take risks, to save for the future, to find better ways of doing 
things, to learn and educate themselves, solve problems of collective action and provide public goods. 
Others do not.” (2004: p.12) 
Acemoglu et. al (2001) is a referential paper on addressing the endogeneity problem of 
institutions when examining and evaluating difference in economic performance among countries. 
The authors uses differences in mortality rates as an instrument to estimate the effect of institutions 
on economic growth using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, and the results are robust to 
different specifications, indicating the occurrence of significant effects of institutions on per capita 
income for a set of 64 countries. The main idea of the model is to estimate the coefficients associated 
to variables (indexes) of protection to the risk of expropriation as a proxy for institutions. The 
essential idea is that countries with better institutions, with more secure property rights, and policies 
with less distortion, tend to invest more in physical and human capital and usually have a more 
efficient use of such production factors in order to achieve a higher level of income. The authors 
make clear that when using the mortality rate as an instrument for institutions, this is valid only if 
other variables that are correlated with the mortality rate are not related to the per capita income. The 
idea is that the instrument for institutions (mortality rate) should be an important factor to capture the 
variation observed in the institutions, without having an effect on the growth rate. 
Rodrik (1999) emphasizes the difference in growth rates between the periods 1960-75 and 
1975-89, and the motivation of the study is to understand some issues and questions there are not a 
consensus in the growth literature. Among these one can list the following: what are the crucial 
factors responsible for instability in the economic performance of developing countries; why 
countries that have a good economic performance in the 1960s and 1970s have had problems in the 
following decades; why some countries were strongly but shortly affected by external volatility in the 
second half of 1970 while others took a lot of time to recover from such external shocks; what are the 
main reasons underlying the process of expansion of the adverse effects of external shocks on the 
growth rate of many economies. 
The hypothesis investigated by Rodrik (1999) is that domestic social conflicts are crucial to 
understanding and answering the above questions as these conflicts have negative impact on 
productivity, besides being related to cases involving the postponement of policies  associated to 
fiscal and relative prices (real exchange rate and wages) adjustments. Another key aspect is the effect 
that such conflicts have on the uncertainty (investment decision) of the economy and the diversion of 
activities out of the production sector.  The empirical analysis uses indicators of inequality, ethnic 
fragmentation, quality of government institutions, rule of law, democratic rights and social protection 
network to test Rodrik´s hypothesis. The results indicate that countries that had the greatest reduction 
in the rate of GDP growth in 1975 were those where society is more fragmented and has fragile 
institutions. The degree of severity of external shocks can be considered secondary in explaining the 
differences in growth rates between countries, and once controlling for social conflicts and 
institutional quality, other factors (trade policies, government consumption, ratio of debt / exports) 
have little explanatory power over such differences in growth rates, or are secondary factors when 
                                                           
2 See Bruno and Easterly (1995) for additional evidence on inflation and growth.    5 
 
compared with the social conflict that ultimately is linked to the adoption of inadequate 
macroeconomic policies. 
The second branch of the literature deals with empirical tests on the role of institutions and 
other factors in explaining why countries have such a huge difference in per capita income levels.  
Hall and Jones (1999) is one of the pioneers in examining the issue of why output per capita is 
so different across countries using a large set of countries. The main goal is to explain changes in 
long-run economic performance focusing directly in the investigation of crosss-section in levels. One 
of the main empirical findings is that differences in capital accumulation, productivity and ultimately 
in per capita income is due to differences in institutions and government policies. The authors call 
this as social infrastructure and considered it as endogenous, which requires finding variables that are 
good instruments (location and language) in order to overcome problems such as coefficient bias in 
the presence of endogenous variables.
3 The authors emphasize that productivity is crucial to 
understand such differences in income levels. The idea is to answer two main questions: why there is 
a significant difference in investments in physical and human capital? And why there is an important 
difference across countries in terms of productivity?  
In order to answer the questions listed above, Hall and Jones (1999) have a hypothesis based 
on the argument that long run economic performance of a country is primarily determined by social 
infrastructure, or in other words, differences in capital accumulation, productivity and ultimately in 
per capita output is due to differences in social infrastructure. Examining 127 countries the authors 
found a close and positive relation between output per capita and social infrastructure. After 
controlling for endogeneity of social infrastructure (institutions and government policies) they still 
find evidence that most of differences in long-run economic performance is due to differences in 
social infrastructure across countries. The estimated coefficient for output per capita and productivity 
is 0.60 and the correlation between the differences for the two series in log is 0.89. Most of the 
differences in output per capita is due to productivity by a factor of 8.3 against human capital with 2.2 
and capital intensity with 1.8 when comparing the five highest and lowest countries in terms of output 
per capita, which are different by more than 30 times for this set of countries.   
The estimation of the social infrastructure index (SI) by Hall and Jones (1999) uses a 
combination of two indexes to construct the proxy for SI. One is the index of government 
antidiversion policies (GADP) based on data from the Political Risk Service (130 countries and 24 
categories) and the authors select five categories: law and order; bureaucracy quality; corruption; risk 
of expropriation and government repudiation of contracts, each of them as average for the period of 
1986-95. The second index tries to capture the degree of openness to trade and it draws from the data 
developed by Sachs and Warner (1995) and it varies from 0 to 1 according to criteria such as: level of 
nontariff barriers; average tariff rates; black market premium; country classified as non-socialist; and 
absence of government as a monopolist for major exports. The final proxy for SI is given by the sum 
of GADP and the openness index and the instruments used captures greography characteristics 
(distance from the equator), the Western European influence (primary spoken language) and the (log) 
predicted trade share of the economy contructured by Frankel and Romer (1996). The estimated 
model for output per capita shows that the estimated coefficient for social infrastructure is positive 
(for the main specification  ˆ 5.14 SI β = with four instruments) and statistically significant for all 
specifications. The authors conclude after some robustness tests that taking into account elements 
such as greography (distance from the equator) and Western influence (language), differences in 
social infrastructure determines (cause) large differences in per capita income across countries, the 
ultimate empirical goal of the paper.   
Other works such as the one developed by Easterly and Levine (2003) is focused on 
understanding differences in per capita income across countries. They develop an analysis first 
reviewing the empirical literature / theories of how geography, institutions, and policy influence 
                                                           
3 It is worth to mention that early studies such as Mankiw, Romer and Weiss (1992) was crucial in setting an empirical 
agenda to investigate differences in per capita income levels across countries based on differences in human and physical 
capital and productivity.  6 
 
economic development and so the disparity in income levels. The geography / endowment hypothesis 
argues that environment has a direct impact on the quality of land, labor, and production technologies, 
while the institution view is based on the idea that the environment’s main impact on economic 
development operates through institutions. The policy view tries to minimize the relevance of tropics, 
germs, and crops as a fundamental determinant of differences in economic development and income 
level by arguing that economic policies and institutions are a result of current knowledge and political 
forces. Within this perspective, to change income levels it is necessary to it is necessary to understand 
each country policies and institutions. Ultimately, Easterly and Levine (2003) wants to empirically 
address which of these three views / theories are more adequate to explain differences in income 
levels across countries. 
4 
Easterly and Levine (2003) uses settler mortality as an indicator of endowments to test the 
greography and the institutions hypotheses and other control variables such as: latitude, dummies for 
crops / minerals, landlocked, a measure for openness (Frankel and Romer, 1999), real exchange rate 
overvaluation and inflation to address the policy view, and six institutions quality indexes from 
Kaufman et. al (1999) to capture the relevance of institutions in a per capita income model. The 
authors also use other control variables such as ethnolinguistic diversity, religion and French legal 
origin. 
The initial step was to estimate a model for a sample of 72 countries by OLS with 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors for the log of the per capita GDP on the endowment 
variables and the results indicate that endowments explain cross-country variation in per capita 
income. The next step was to run an OLS model and check if endowments help to explain cross-
country differences in institutional development and the results indicate that variables like settler 
mortality and natural resources (germs and crops) are the dominant forces to understand institutional 
development. Up to this point the Easterly and Levine (2003) have found evidence that endowments 
have an impact on economic and institutional development. Following this result, the authors estimate 
a 2SLS model for the log of per capita GDP using four instruments (settler mortality, latitude, 
landlocked and crops/minerals) in the first stage estimation, and institutions index, French legal 
origin, religion, ethnolinguistic diversity and oil as exogenous variables in the second stage 
estimation. The estimated coefficients for the institution index are all positive and statistically 
significant and the overidentification tests were not rejected indicating that the set of instruments are 
valid. The final estimated model treats macroeconomic policy variables (inflation, openness and real 
exchange rate overvaluation) as endogenous using 2SLS and the evidence suggests that such policies 
do not explain differences in per capita income after taking into account the impact of institutions on 
income levels. The estimated coefficients for the institution index are all positive and statistically 
significant.  
  The empirical evidence found by Easterly and Levine (2003) suggests that endowments 
(tropics, germs, and crops) have an impact on per capita income through institutions but not a direct 
effect, which is a support for the institution view but not for the greography one. The same is true for 
what they call policies variables which has no impact on development when controlling for 
                                                           
4 The geography / endowment hypothesis is associated to different studies such as Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997), Bloom 
and Sachs (1998) and Sachs (2001), arguing for the presence of direct effects of tropics, germs, and crops on 
development. The Institutions hypothesis relates the effect of tropics, germs, and crops through institutions and can be 
associated to works such as Hall and Jones (1999) who uses institutional quality as one component of social infrastructure 
which is crucial to explain differences in productivity, allowing for the use of instruments such as distance from the 
equator and European language. Acemoglu et.al (2001) is another example of the institution view with a germs theory of 
institution by using setler´s mortality as an instrument for institutions.  The policy view argues in favor of sound 
macroeconomic policies, openness to international trade, and the absence of capital account controls considered as 
important measures to foster economic growth and to increase per capita income. Tropics, germs, and crops may influence 
production technologies and institutions but to improve economic development it is necessary to change policies targeting 
low inflation, increase in trade and financial integration to the world. One example of this view is Frankel and Romer 
(1999) to whom geography matters for economic development through government policy (trade openness).  7 
 
institutions, in other words, institutions rule differences in per capita income levels across countries.
5 
Such empirical results are hand to hand with the work of Acemoglu et. al (2001).  
Acemoglu et. al. (2004) review what is called the geography hypothesis as an alternative to 
explain difference in economic performance among countries and the main idea is to focus on the role 
of physical and geographical environment. This approach emphasizes differences in geography, 
climate and ecology as fundamental in understanding how preferences and the opportunity set of 
individual economic agents in different societies. The greography hypothesis can be devided into 
three versions. The first one highlights how climate may be an important factor of work effort, 
incentives, or productivity. The second one argues that geography may determine the technology 
available to a society, especially in agriculture, while the last one is based on the idea that infectious 
disease is costly and more likely to happen in the tropics than in the temperate zones, which can 
mitigate economic performance over time. (Sachs, 2000) 
One can say that there is a clear disagreement among the role played by greography in 
explaining differences in per capita income levels. Sachs (2003) is an example of studies that do not 
agree with others such as Acemoglu et. al (2001), Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et. al (2004) 
on the proposition that the role of geography in explaining cross-country differences in per income is 
secondary and operates mainly through institutions. According to the author per capita income, 
economic growth, and other economic and demographic dimensions are strongly correlated with 
variables associated to geography and econology, including climate zone, disease ecology, and 
distance from the coast. The variable used to contradict the other studies is malaria transmission, 
which is strongly affected by ecological conditions and has a direct impact on per capita income once 
controlling for institutions quality.  
Rodrik et. al (2004) empirically investigates the contribution of institutions, geography and 
trade in explaining differences in per capita income across countries and the evidence suggests the 
predominance of institutions over geography and trade using different instruments. There authors 
argue that that integration to the world economy and the quality of institutions should be treated as 
endogenous since they affect each other and are affected by geographical variables and by income 
levels. Dealing with this means to take into account endogeneity and reverse causality issues in 
estimating a cross country income model.  
The main empirical evidence found by Rodrik et. al (2004) is that once institutions are part of 
the regression (2SLS), integration has no direct effect on per capita income, while geography 
measures have at best only weak direct effects even though they are important to understand the 
quality of institutions. Trade does not reveal to be statistically significant once institutions are 
controlled for and it seems to have an unexpected negative sign. The estimated coefficients for the 
measure of property rights and the rule of law are positive and statistically significant. The authors 
also found similar evidence to Easterly and Levine (2003) that geography has a significant impact on 
the quality of institutions and this is the channel through which it affects income levels. In the 
preferred model specification (settler mortality as instrument for institutions quality) developed by 
Rodrik et. al (2004) it was possible to account for half of the variance in cross country incomes and 
trade and distance from the equator are not statistically significant. Comparing the estimated 
coefficients (table 2 and OLS) for institutions (rule of law), geography (distance from the equator) 
and integration (log of trade to GDP) after they have been standardized in order to be comparable, the 
results for the log of GDP per capita reveals that the coefficient for institutions is positive and 
statistically significant and greater than the coefficient for geography (positive and significant), which 
is greater than the estimated coefficient for integration (positive but not significant). The 2SLS 
estimation reported on table 3 reveals on the preferred specification (column 6) that the coefficient for 
institutions is positive (1.98) and statistically significant, while the coefficients for geography (-0.72) 
and integration (-0.31) are not significant and the latter has an unexpected sign.  
                                                           
5 Such empirical results are hand to hand with the work of Acemoglu et. al (2001).  
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The main criticism stated by Sachs (2003) with respect to the institutions rule argument is that 
there are specification problems in the model and how they test the primacy of institutions. The first 
specification problem is associated to the use of a static rather than a dynamic model for per capita 
income and the author argues that it is more likely that the quality of institutions in a given time 
period will affect the growth rate and not income level but the three mentioned studies are concerned 
in explaining differences in per capita income and not in growth rates across countries. Other than 
this Sachs (2003) argues that differences in income levels should not be explained by only a few 
variables excluding geography and the choice made by studies such as Rodrik et. al (2004) in using 
distance from the equator is not adequate. Sachs (2003) uses three instruments to estimate a 2SLS 
model of the log of GNP per capita adjusted to PPP in 1995: KGPTEMP is a measure of the share of 
a country population in temperate ecozones; LOGMORT is an estimate of mortality rates of British 
soldiers and other populations in the early 19
th century; and ME is a measure of malaria risk. For all 
the regressions quality of institutions and malaria risk are statistically significant 
  Regarding the use of indexes of institutional quality based on surveys of foreign and domestic 
investors (Rule of Law, Corruption, Investment Profile and Bureaucracy) Rodrik (2004) states that 
such indexes are able to capture investor´s perceptions but not exactly which are the rules governing 
these institutions, which is a limitation and future research on growth disparities will have to deal 
with this. It is also necessary to distinguish between stimulating and sustaining economic growth and 
better and more reliable institutions are more important for the latter than to the former meaning that 
developing countries can boost initial growth with some minor changes in their institutional 
environment.  
 
2 – Insitutions and GDP per capita Level: Empirical Evidences 
  This section summarizes methodological aspects of using two stage least square (2SLS) and 
optimal GMM methods for models of cross country income differences and reports the estimation 
results on tables 1 and 2.  
2.1 – Methological Issues 
  This section of the paper has two goals. First, specify the two stage least square estimation 
(2SLS) procedure and the optimal GMM (OGMM) since they are widely used in the cross section 
models of differences in per capita income across countries. Second, compare these two estimates for 
different sets of countries using institutions, geography, integration and other control and instrumental 
variables.  
  The cross section studies on per capita income differences across countries are almost always 
based on the use of two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation since this is the core instrument when 
dealing with endogeneity problems as it happens with the inclusion of institutions in this kind of 
model.  
  Considering the following model for a dependent variable (y) on a single regressor (x): 
  yx u β =+                                                                                                                   (1) 
Assuming that the regressor (x) is endogenous, the OLS estimation is not valid since it 
violates the assumption required for consistency that the error term (u) is not correlated to the 
regressors ( (/) 0 Eu x= ) and the instrumental variable (IV) approach deals with this by selecting 
new variables (z) that are highly correlated to the regressors ( (/) 0 E zx≠ ) but not with the error 
term ( (/) 0 Eu z=  ).  
The 2SLS estimation is based on a two stage procedure when first it implements an OLS 
estimation of the endogenous variable (institutions in our example) as the dependent variable as a 
function of exogenous variables and the new set of instruments (z) and this is called the reduced form 9 
 
equation.
6 The second stage is the OLS regression of the dependent variable of the original model 
(log of per capita GDP) on the exogenous variables and the replacement of endogenous regressors by 
predictions from the first stage. One advantage of the 2SLS estimation is that In the presence of 
independent and homocedastic errors it is the most efficient estimator but since this is not an easy 
assumption, we use the correction for heteroskedasticity in our estimates (tables 1 and 2).  
Another possibility is to use the optimal GMM estimator (OGMM) with the heteroskedasticity 
correction, which is based on a weighting matrix that it different from the one used by the 2SLS 
estimation.
7 One of the problems associated to the 2SLS estimation is how to avoid the use of weak 
instruments since they will result in less precise coefficients due to high standard errors (lower t-
statistics) and the occurrence of finite sample bias (the IV estimator is not centered on the true 
populational coefficient).
8 
2.2 – Empirical Results 
First of all, it should be emphasized that the set of instruments used in the 2SLS and OGMM 
estimation when dealing with endogeneity of institutions (Law) are Latitude, SettlerMort, Legoruk, 
EnglishLang, and EuropeLang, where for integration (Trade) we use the index developed by 
FrankelRomer to capture perceived integration.
9  
The estimation of the cross-section models of per capita GDP levels for the complete sample 
(91 countries) using 2SLS and OGMM is reported on table 1. The 2SLS estimated models (columns 
4, 5 and 6) shows that the coefficients for institutions (Law) are positive and statistically significant in 
all three models. It is necessary to interpret this result with some caution since models (4) and (5) that 
are over-identified have overidentification tests that reject the null and so the set of instruments are 
not valid. Geography (Latitude) is only statistically significant in model (6) using 2SLS but with 
unexpected negative sign meaning that countries far away from the equator have lower levels of per 
capita income. Trade (integration) is not statistically significant in the two 2SLS estimation (5 and 6) 
regardless if it is considered as exogenous (5) or treated as endogenous (6) and instrumented by 
FrankelRomer index of perceived trade openness.  The GMM estimations are reported on columns 7 
and 8 and we have the same empirical findings from the 2SLS. Institutions (Law) have positive and 
statistically significant coefficients, while Geography (Latitude) have negative but not statistically 
significant coefficients and Integration (Trade) is negatively associated to per capita GDP levels and 
not statistically significant. All the results should be interpreted with caution since the 






                                                           
6 It is necessary to have at least the same number of instruments as the number of endogenous variables in order to avoid 
underidentification problems when there is no consistent IV estimator. Just-identified (Over-Identified) are the cases 
where the number of instruments are the same (greater than) the number of endogenous variables.  
7 For the just-identified case there is no difference between the 2SLS and the OGMM. In other words, there is no meaning 
in estimating an equivalent model of the 2SLS column (6) on tables 1 and 2 using OGMM since the estimated coefficients 
and statistical significance would be the same given that this model is just-identified.   
8 See Cameron and Trivedi (2008) cap.6 for further details on 2SLM and OGMM. The paper will use overidentification 
tests through the use of the estat overid command for Stata 10.0 and the estat firststage command to evaluate the presence 
of weak instruments (F-stat of first stage).  
9 Table 3A of the appendix reports the endogeneity tests for institutions (Law) and integration (Trade) for the restricted 
sample (includes settler mortality), and we were able to reject the null hypothesis meaning that Law and Trade can be 
considered as endogenous variables. See also table 1A of the appendix for the description of each variable used in the two 
model estimation and tables 4A and 5A for the sample descriptive statistics for cross-section and panel data.   
10 Tables 1 and 2 report the F-stat First Stage which is a joint test for the significance of the instruments used to 
instrument the endogenous variable. In all model specifications for the 2SLS and the OGMM and in both samples 
(restricted and complete) we were able to reject the null hypothesis meaning that the set of instruments are statistically 
significant. It should be mentioned that this is not a direct test for weak instruments.  10 
 
Table 1- Cross-Section Real Per Capita GDP Models (Complete Sample): OLS, 2SLS and OGMM
Variables / Method  OLS  OLS  OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS  OGMM OGMM
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8)
Latitude  4.2889 1.2449 1.4616 -0.9083 -1.9802 1.3004  -0.7986 -1.8955
 (0.000)*** (0.019)**  (0.006)*** (0.537) (0.273) (0.007)***  (0.577) (0.298)
Law   0.5561  0.5201 0.9348 1.1261 0.5364  0.9385 1.1331
   (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Trade     0.1750 -0.1723 0.1348  -0.1425
     (0.172) (0.458) (0.384)  (0.543)
First Stage (OLS)      
Instruments      
      
Legoruk     0.3582 0.3162   0.3582 0.3162
     (0.244) (0.216)   (0.244) (0.216)
EnglishLang     0.3260 0.2356   0.3260 0.2356
     (0.603) (0.732)   (0.603) (0.732)
EuropeLang     0.2832 0.4426   0.2832 0.4426
     (0.238) (0.082)*   (0.238) (0.082)*
FrankelRomer     0.5434   
     (0.000)*** 
R2  0.497 0.683 0.688 0.601 0.499 0.690  0.599 0.493
F-stat First Stage (prob)      (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Overid (prob)      (0.042)** (0.093)*   (0.042)* (0.093)*
Overid = test of overidentification restrictions  
*, ** and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1%   
 
  The next step was to estimate the same models from table 1 but now for a restricted sample 
which includes countries in our sample with data for Settler Mortality, which is the instrumental variable 
used by Acemoglu et. al (2001). The only difference is that on table 2, settler mortality was used as an 
instrument while in table 1 it was not.   
 
 
Table 2- Cross-Section Real Per Capita GDP Models (Restricted Sample): OLS, 2SLS and OGMM
Variables / Method  OLS  OLS  OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS  OGMM OGMM
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8)
Latitude 3.3758 0.8588  1.3301 -1.1194 -1.8112 0.9088  -0.3032 -0.9775
 (0.000)***  (0.239)  (0.091)* (0.356) (0.252) (0.211)  (0.778) (0.512)
Law   0.5598  0.5089 0.9677 1.0929 0.5464  0.8767 1.0420
   (0.000)***  (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Trade     0.2465 -0.1251 0.1129  -0.0549
     (0.125) (0.591) (0.531)  (0.802)
      
First Stage (OLS)      
Instruments      
SettlerMort     -0.0005 -0.0004   -0.0005 -0.0004
     (0.087)* (0.030)**   (0.087)* (0.030)**
Legoruk     0.2408 0.2652   0.2408 0.2652
     (0.568) (0.425)   (0.568) (0.425)
EnglishLang     1.4165 1.1257   1.4165 1.1257
     (0.125) (0.257)   (0.125) (0.257)
EuropeLang     0.0514 0.2931   0.0514 0.2931
     (0.881) (0.422)   (0.881) (0.422)
FrankelRomer     0.6022   
     (0.000)*** 
R2 0.2068 0.5363  0.5339 0.377 0.2586 0.5596  0.443 0.305
F-stat First Stage (prob)      (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Overid (prob)      (0.0237)** (0.0297)**   (0.0237)** (0.0297)**
Overid = test of overidentification restrictions 
*, ** and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1%   




The 2SLS estimated models from table 2 (columns 4, 5 and 6) shows that the coefficients for 
institutions (Law) are positive and statistically significant in all three models. In the same way when 
we present the results from table 1, it is necessary to interpret this result with some caution since 
models (4) and (5) that are over-identified have overidentification tests that reject the null and so the 
set of instruments are not valid. Geography (Latitude) is not statistically significant in any of the three 
models using 2SLS and it has an unexpected negative sign in model 6. Trade (integration) is not 
statistically significant in the two 2SLS estimation (5 and 6) regardless if it is considered as 
exogenous (5) or treated as endogenous (6) and instrumented by the index constructed by 
FrankelRomer.  The GMM estimations are reported on columns 7 and 8 of table 2 and we have the 
same empirical findings from the 2SLS. Institutions (Law) have positive and statistically significant 
coefficients, while Geography (Latitude) have negative but not statistically significant coefficients 
and Integration (Trade) is negatively associated to per capita GDP levels and not statistically 
significant, and the two OGMM estimation have problems in terms of validity of the set of 
instruments.  
Summarizing the results for the cross-country differences in per capita income levels it is fair 
to say that there are some mixed evidences regarding the role of institutions (Law) since all the 
estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant but the instruments are not valid. 
Integration (Trade) and Geography (Latitude) do not seem to play a direct and significant role on 
explaining differences in per capita income levels across countries.  
 
3 – Institutions and GDP per capita Growth: Emprical Evidences 
  This section of the paper presents some methodological issues on panel data estimation for 
long run growth models and the use of the GMM method and it reports on table 3 the estimated 
coefficients for the complete sample and for developing countries.  
3.1 – Methological Issues 
  This section of the study aims to specify the methodology of panel data analysis using GMM 
estimation to be used in the econometric analysis, specifying the growth models to be estimated, the 
number of countries in the sample and the explanatory variables. 
The study uses a dynamic model of panel data and the estimation method is the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM). The motivation for the use of this methodology is the possibility to take 
into account the following: i) the time series dimension of the data, ii) non observable country 
specific effects; iii) inclusion of lagged dependent variable among the explanatory variables, and iv) 
the possibility that all explanatory variables are endogenous. The standard approach on panel data 
starts with the assumption that the growth rate path is consistent with the following procedure: 
 
,1 ,1 , , (1 ) ' i t it it it i it yy y X α βη ε −− −= − + + +                                                    (2) 
Where   is the natural log of per capita real GDP,   represents the set of explanatory variables,   is a 
non-observable and country specific term,   is a random term and the subscripts i and t refers to 
country and time, respectively. 
11  
                                                           
11 The specification of the model includes a term that varies over time and is constant across countries, and such term is 
not reported in the following equations just to simplify the presentation. This time-specific term was included in all 
regressions estimated by including the time Dummies variables for each period (five year average) of the sample. 
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It should be noted that the time specific effect allows to control the international conditions 
that change over time and ultimately affect the growth performance of countries in the sample, while 
the non observable country specific effect ( i η ) incorporates factors that influence the growth of per 
capita GDP and are potentially correlated with the explanatory variables. 
What characterizes the dynamic relationship is the presence of lagged dependent variable as 
one of the explanatory variables, which is evident once we rewrite equation (2) as: 
,1 , , ' it i t i t i i t yy X α βη ε − =++ +                                                                                      (3) 
The elimination of the country specific and the non observable term ( ) is obtained once we 
apply the first difference to equation (3): 
,1 ,1 ,2 , ,1 , ,1 () ' () ( ) i t it it it it it it it yy y y XX α βε ε −− − − − −= − + − + −                                                       (4) 
The use of instruments is required to deal with the possible endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables and the correlation between the new term of error,   , and the lagged dependent 
variable,  . Under the assumptions that the error term ( ) is not serially correlated and 
the explanatory variables ( ) are weakly exogenous, lagged values of the explanatory variables can 
be used as instruments, as specified under the following moment conditions: 
 for all  ;                                                                 (5) 
 for all  ;                                                                (6) 
The GMM estimator based on the moment conditions (5) and (6) is called GMM-DIFF. There 
are statistical problems associated with the use of GMM-DIFF: statistically, when the regressors in 
equation (4) are persistent, lagged levels of   and   are weak instruments. The use of weak 
instruments asymptotically implies that the variance of the coefficient increases and in small samples 
the coefficients can be bias. To reduce the potential bias and inaccuracy associated with the use of 
DIFF-GMM estimator, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997) develop a system 
of regressions in differences and levels. The instruments for the regression in differences are the 
lagged levels of the explanatory variables, moment conditions (5) and (6). The instruments for the 
regression in levels are the lagged differences of explanatory variables. These are appropriate 
instruments under an additional assumption, that is, although there may be correlation between the 
levels of explanatory variables and the country specific effect ( ) in equation (3), there is no 
correlation between those variables in differences and the country specific effect ( . This can be 
represented as:  
  and      for all p and q                      (7) 
The moment conditions for the regression in level, the second part of the system, are:  
 for                                                                           (8) 
 for                                                                          (9) 
The GMM estimator based on the moment conditions (5), (6), (8) and (9) is called GMM-
SYST. The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the moment conditions. To 
such extent it will be considered two specification tests based on Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano 13 
 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997): i) Hansen test is a test of overidentifying 
restrictions and the joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the 
estimated equation; ii) and the Arellano-Bond test which tests the hypothesis of no second order serial 
correlation in the error term.
12 
The justification for estimating both the Difference and the System GMM is associated to the 
debate on the problems of too many instruments. Roodman (2008) develops a detailed analysis on the 
issue of two many instruments when using GMM Difference and GMM System. The System GMM 
uses lagged variables in levels to instrument the differenced equation and lagged differences to 
instrument levels, which might end up with too many instruments. The author discuss the symptoms 
of instrument proliferation showing that as T increase the number of instruments can be too large 
compared to the sample size and the outcome is to invalidade some asymptotic results and 
specification tests. Too many instruments can overfit endogenous variables and fail to expunge their 
endogenous components, resulting in biased coefficients. Another argument is that the Hansen and 
Difference-in-Hansen tests can be weak when using the System GMM in the presence of 
overidentification. Among the procedures to reduce the number of instruments one possibility is to 
use only a few lags instead of all the available ones as instruments, and a second one is based on the 
idea of combining instruments through addition into smaller sets.  
The panel data model is estimated for the complete sample (91 countries) and for developing 
countries over the period 1980-2004. The data used are transformed and are based on averages for 
non-overlapping periods of five years (1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004), 
so that there are five data entries for each country for each variable in the sample. There is no data for 
all countries, time and variables, so the estimated panel is an unbalanced one. The variables used in 
the econometric estimation are reported on table 1A of the appendix, where the variables were in the 
logarithmic form except for the time dummies and the indexes of institution quality.
13 
3.2 – Empirical Results  
The analysis of table 3 reveals that the coefficient for institution (Law) is statistically 
significant only when using the System GMM for the complete sample in a more parcimonious 
specification (without Credit, Pop and TermsTrade) and this result is also true in three out of four (5, 
6 and 8) estimation for developing countries but only at the 10% significance level. The results also 
suggest that Gov (government consumption) has a negative and statistically significant coefficient in 
seven out of eight estimates, suggesting a robust role played by such policy variable, meaning that 
countries with more fiscal discipline benefit over time in terms of economic growth.
14 Some minor 
evidence of significance was found for Educ only for model (2) using System-GMM, for Credit in 
models (4) and (8) using Difference-GMM but only at 10% and for Pop in model (2) using the 
System-GMM. The estimated coefficients for the integration to the world economy (Trade), 
macroeconomic stability (Inf) and Terms of Trade were not statistically significant in any model 
specification. 
After all one can say that the results for the long-run per capita GDP growth models suggest 
that there are mixed evidence for the role of institutions (Law) in fostering economic growth and the 
System-GMM is the one that is more likely to capture such role. Another lesson to be draw from the 
estimated growth models is that fiscal discipline, measured by government consumption / GDP, plays 
a crucial role in stimulating long-run growth.    
 
                                                           
12 See the AR(2) results and the Overid tests on table 3.   
13 The index for Law was constructed so that the higher the value, the better the environment regarding law enforcement 
and property rights.  
14 The results for the AR(2), Hansen and Hansen Diff tests indicate that we are able to reject the null hypothesis meaning 
that there is no second order autocorrelation and the set of instruments are valid, with only one exception for the Hansen 





Table 3- Real GDP Growth Models: GMM System and Difference   
    Complete Sample  Developing Countries 
Variables / 
Method 
System System  Diff  Diff  System System  Diff  Diff 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Growthppp -1  0.1007  0.1574  -0.099  -0.1476  0.1463  0.0757  -0.0084  -0.1345 
 (0.251)  (0.053)*  (0.106)  (0.060)  (0.059)* (0.438)  (0.907)  (0.140) 
Yinitial -0.0800  -0.5590  -0.2933  -0.2461 0.0132  -0.0578  -0.2180 -0.2322 
 (0.748)  (0.005)***  (0.000)***  (0.004)***  (0.687)  (0.098)*  (0.015)**  (0.005)*** 
Educ 0.0148  0.1087  -0.0079  -0.2302  0.0429  0.0987  0.1783  -0.1828 
 (0.736)  (0.018)** (0.943)  (0.100)* (0.465) (0.127) (0.380)  (0.393) 
Law 0.0351  0.0233  0.0165  0.0232  0.0259  0.0325  0.0126  0.0446 
 (0.002)***  (0.108)  (0.205)  (0.167)  (0.051)* (0.064)*  (0.374)  (0.058)* 
Trade 0.0047  -0.2111  0.0592  0.0245  -0.0111  -0.0467  0.1240  0.0655 
 (0.832)  (0.306)  (0.317)  (0.798) (0.641) (0.246)  (0.104)  (0.396) 
Gov -0.1042  -0.1277  -0.1235  -0.1688  -0.0935  -0.0783  -0.1477  -0.1458 
 (0.010)***  (0.002)*** (0.023)** (0.001)***  (0.027)** (0.103) (0.017)** (0.045)** 
Inf 0.0007  -0.0123  -0.0074  -0.0107  0.0008  -0.0171  -0.0065  -0.0098 
 (0.944)  (0.196)  (0.198)  (0.341) (0.934) (0.156)  (0.520)  (0.358) 
Credit   -0.0256    -0.0504    -0.0041    -0.0868 
   (0.160)    (0.069)*    (0.925)  (0.070)* 
Pop   -0.0555    -0.0198    -0.0520    -0.0093 
   (0.003)**   (0.184)   (0.169)   (0.715) 
TermsTrade    0.0265     0.0055     0.0483     0.0036  
   (0.450)    (0.887)   (0.256)   (0.883) 
AR(2) 0.160  0.411  0.887  0.648  0.663  0.873  0.802  0.490 
Hansen 0.209  0.884  0.325  0.282  0.964  0.999  0.362  0.811 
Hansen Diff  0.025  1.000      0.998  1.000     
No. Obs.  306  264  224  191  220  190  160  137 
Estimation includes time dummies and a dummy for Africa    
*, ** and *** = signifficant at 10%, 5% and 1%    
4 – Empirical Results and the Literature     
It is clear that there is an extensive list of empirical studies on per capita income levels and 
growth models trying to address the discussion of endogeneity, reverse causality and their pitfalls, 
together with an attempt to separate the interpretation of what is really important in explaining 
differences in income levels and growth rates across countries and what roles the set of instruments 
play in this interpretation. One of the studies to address these issues is Rodrik et. al (2004): 
“We now want to clarify a point regarding the interpretation of results. In particular, we want to stress the 
distinction between using an instrument to identify an exogenous source of variation in the independent 
variable of interest and laying out a full theory of cause and effect. In our view, this distinction is not made 
adequately clear in Acemoglu et al. and is arguably blurred by Easterly and Levine (2003). (…) While 
colonial history does not quite provide a satisfactory account of income differences around the world, it can 
still provide a valid instrument. And that, in our view, is where Acemoglu et al. paper is successful. An 
instrument is something that simply has some desirable statistical properties. It need not be a large part of 
the causal story. (…) Easterly and Levine (2003) also assigns a causal role to the settler mortality 
instrument and interpret it as a geographical determinant of institutions such as ‘crops and germs’ rather 
than viewing it as a device to capture the exogenous source of variation in institutions. (…) Our view is that 
we should not elevate settler mortality beyond its status as an instrument, and avoid favoring either a 15 
 
colonial view of development (as some readings of Acemoglu et al. would have it) or a geography-based 
theory of development (as some readings of Easterly and Levine would have it).” (2004: p.154-55) 
  Rodrik (2004,2008) argue in favor of the necessity to implement institutional reforms to foster 
economic development but there is no clear perception of what kind of institutions each country 
should have. There are some crucial aspects such as providing security of property rights, the 
enforcement of contracts, increase integration to the international market, macroeconomic stability 
and a process of building better voice and accountability, but the pace and paths to achieve such 
elements are different for each country, especially when comparing developing and developed 
countries. That is what the author call “appropriate” institutions since each country has distinct 
economic and social constraints when they implement institutions reforms. Within this line of 
argument there is a criticism to the type of institutions reforms promoted by multilateral organizations 
(IMF, WTO and World Bank) and dealing with such reforms in developing countries may require a 
second best strategy which is more grounded to the economic and social reality of these countries. 
The author also examines the costs over time associated to the institutional arrangement based on the 
combination of flexible exchange rates, inflation targeting and increasing central bank independence 
for developing countries arguing that such arrangement might have unfavorable consequences when 
there is a trend towards real exchange rate appreciation and its perverse impact on economic growth. 
In a few words Rodrik argues that “The lesson here is that institutional rigidity pays off when lack of 
credibility and time inconsistency are the main problems of the day, but that it can eventually become 
a drag on growth. No single set of best practices will serve the needs of all countries at all times.” 
(2008: p.10)  
  Based on our estimates of the two models (tables 1 to 3) and from Figure 1 on one side 
institutional quality (Law) seems to has a positive relation to GDP growth rates and to GDP per capita 
income levels, but the results should be interpreted with caution since for the income levels model 
there are problems with valid set of instruments (2SLS and OGMM), and for the growth model 
institution (Law) is statistically significant only when using the System GMM for the complete 
sample in a more parcimonious specification (without Credit, Pop and TermsTrade) and for three out 
of four estimation for developing countries but only at the 10% significance level. Such results should 
not be taken as an empirical support for the argument that institutions rule and institutions should not 
be seen as causing cross country differences in per capita income levels, even though it seems to 
matter.  
  When examining most of the reported econometric estimation results from the literature such 
as Rodrik et. al (2004) table 3 when they present the 2SLS estimation there is no overidentification 
test statistics for any of the first seven model specification (preferred specification is model 6) and 
when they report such tests (models 8 and 9) the p-values indicate rejection of the null hypothesis and 
the instruments are not valid.
15 Easterly and Levine (2003) when estimating the 2SLS (table 4) reports 
the F test for the first stage estimation using four instrumental variables (Settler Mortality, Latitude, 
Landlocked and Crops/Minerals) but there is no overidentification tests, even though they mention 
that they do not reject the null in any of the overidentification tests. The authors do report the 
overidentification tests (table 5 and 6) when policy variables (inflation, openness and real exchange 
rate overvaluation) are included in the model.    
 
Concluding Remarks  
The present paper aims to answer two theoretical and empirical questions. First, institutions 
have a primary role on explaining the huge cross-country differences on per capita income levels 
                                                           
15 The same pattern (lack of overidentification tests) holds for tables 6 and 7 when checking for robustness of the results 
obtained in table 3.  16 
 
when compared to other control variables such as integration and geography? Second, does long-run 
growth performance relies mainly on institutions quality? 
Considering the results for the cross-country differences in per capita income levels it is fair to 
say that there are some mixed evidences regarding the role of institutions (Law) since all the 
estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant but the instruments are not valid. 
Integration (Trade) and Geography (Latitude) do not seem to play a direct and significant role on 
explaining differences in per capita income levels across countries. The results from the per capita 
GDP growth models suggests that there are mixed evidence for the role of institutions (Law) in 
fostering long run economic growth and the System-GMM is the one that is more likely to capture 
such role.  
Even though good institutions are associated to high levels of per capita GDP and higher long 
run per capita GDP growth rates the empirical evidence presented here do not allow one to state that 
there is conclusive evidence that institutions have a primary role on the explanation of cross-country 
per capita income differences nor we can say that long-run per capita growth relies mainly on 
institutions quality. 
Regarding the role of institutions, it is fair to say that more frequently than not, they are 
somehow specific to each economy and society and the ones that perform well in one setting may not 
be adequate in a different environment depending on complementary institutions and norms. One 
good example of this is the comparison of institutions for Russia and China as pointed out by Rodrik 
(2004, 2008) where the later does not have a western type of institution regarded as more adequate to 
foster economic growth and increase income levels but it has found specific ways to stimulate and 
attract an enormous amount of investments and the establishment of domestic contracts that 
ultimately seems to be quite effective in improving growth and income.  
Our empirical results have not been able to corroborate the idea that institutional quality can 
be considered as cause of differences in per capita income  among countries since our 
overidentification tests do not allow one distinguish between such institutions been a result of 
economic prosperity or their cause. Future empirical research on cross country income levels and 
growth models should be focused on the choice of instruments and the construction of better indexes 
for institutions that are able to capture some specificities of each country in terms of different chains / 
environment through which institutions might work in terms of stimulating income and growth.  
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Table 1A: Classification and Variable Description 
Variables Description
Growthppp Real  per capita GDP growth rate measured by PPP 
GDPpercapita  Per capita income level based on PPP 2004
Yinitial  Per capita income level of the year's initial period
Educ  Years of schooling of the population aged  above 15 years 
Inf Average inflation rate – CPI : [log (1+inflation)*100)] 
Gov  Government consumption  / GDP (in log)
Trade  (Exports + Imports) / GDP (in log) 
Credit  Credit / GDP (in log)
Pop Population   
Law  Law and Order index
Latitude Latitude  (degrees)
EnglishLang Origin of Spoken Language (English)
EuropeLang Origin of Spoken Language (European)
SettlerMort Settler´s  mortality
Legoruk Origin of judicial system (United Kingdom)
FrankelRomer  Frankel and Romer index of perceived trade
TermsTrade  Terms of trade 
Asia Dummy for Asian Countries
yr8084,yr8589,   Time Dummies 
Table 2A: Sample of Countries   
Countries Countries  Countries  Countries 
Algeria Ethiopia Malawi Sri Lanka
Argentina Finland Malaysia Sudan
Australia France Mali Sweden
Austria Gabon Malta Switzerland
Bahrein Germany Mexico Syrian Arab Rep.
Bangladesh Ghana Morocco Thailand
Belgium Greece Netherlands Togo
Bolivia Guatemala New  Zealand Trinidad and Tobago
Botswana Haiti Nicarágua Tunisia
Brazil Honduras Niger Turkey
Burkina Faso  Hong Kong Nigeria Uganda
Cameroon Iceland Norway United Kingdom
Canada India Omã United  States
Chile Indonesia Pakistan Uruguay
China Iran Panama Venezuela
Colombia Ireland Papua New guinea Zambia
Congo Israel Paraguay  
Costa Rica  Italy Peru  
Cote d'ivoire  Jamaica Philippines  
Dem. Rep. do CongoJ a pan Portugal  
Denmark Jordan Saudi  Arabia  
Dominican Republic KenyaS e n e gal  
Ecuador Korea Singapore  
Egypt Kuwait South  Africa  




Table 3A - Endogeneity Tests (Restricted Sample With Settler Mortality  
Variables and Instruments                                    
Dependent Variable  Lngdppercapita Lngdppercapita
Endogenous Variable  Law Trade 
Instruments  Settler Mortality and Latitude Frankel Romer
Robust Score - Chi-squared (prob 4.4815 (0.0343) ** 6.6008 (0.0102) **
Robust Regression - F-stat (prob)  4.6375 (0.0364) ** 8.11673 (0.0063) ***
   *, ** and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
  
 Table 4A: Descriptive Statistics – Cross Section  
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
          
Growthppp 89  .29099  .45633  -1.0476  1.959 
GDPpercapita 91  11.632  11.036  .59133  36.450 
Law 91  3.6889  1.3711  .98809  6 
Frankelromer 89  20.278  16.280  2.3  98.14 
Latitude 82  .28872  .1945  .01111  .7222 
Legoruk 82  .32926  .47283  0  1 
Englishlang 89  .08214  .25127  0  .974 
Europelang 89  .30764  .41690  0  1 
SetlerMort 55  225.09  478.10  8.55  2940 
Trade 91  71.284  51.161  19.874  391.95 
  
 Table 5A: Descriptive Statistics – Panel Data 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
          
Growthppp 452  .04656  .12102  -.529  .4262 
Yinitial 452  1.6586  1.1305  -.6813  3.5438 
Educ 399  5.9616  2.6916  .54  12.05 
Law 449  3.6089  1.5629  .7333  6 
Credit 451  48.384  40.161  .9533  218.23 
Gov 451  15.493  5.9792  4.013  48.06 
TermsTrade 381  -.05442  .30859  -4.6052  .6686 
Pop 454  1.8665  1.10137  -.5535  5.925 
Trade 450  68.529  43.038  12.876  391.95 
Inf 444  61.110  394.97  -3.01  6424.98 
 
 